Introduction and Summary
In the theory of perfect competition, it is supposed that there are no institutional restrictions upon prices. Much the same assumption is built into mathematical programming models.
The presence of such constraints implies, for example, that the market price and the marginal productivity (shadow price) of the factors of production will not necessarily coincide.
Unless such constraints are introduced, models cannot explain the simultaneous existence of excess supply of an item and yet a positive market price.
If there is a gap between market and shadow prices, this raises a question. By what set of prices are the economic agents' actions guided? In this paper, we assume that.one sector of the economy, the private sector, is guided by market prices. The other, the public sector, is guided by shadow prices.
With conventional optimization techniques, it is awkward.
--and sometimes inpossible--to handle this type of problem. l~esearch supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant GS-30377 at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University.
Here we shall show that some of these features can be introduced through linear complementarity.
This approach permits us to introduce institutional constraints upon prices--in addition to the technological constraints that are normally generated through the coefficients of each activity in a linear programming model.
Competitive Equilibrium, Linear Complementarity and

Linear Prosrammina
In this section we review the connection between competitive equilibrium, linear complementarity and linear programming for a special case--a "small" economy that can sell unlimited amounts of its outputs upon world markets.
Consider such an economy with n productive processes.
The matrix describes the technology available to the economy. If all coefficients aij 2 0 (i=l, ..., m; j=l, ..., n) , then these denote the amount of item i required to operate activity j at unit leve 1.
Let the column vector2 B = (bl,b2,...,b,)
I .
Then if B > 0, this vector denotes the resources available to the economy.
(If a componenb were negative, this would denote a 2capital letters are used for matrices and vectors,and ' denotes transpose.
delivery requirement rather than a resource available).
We shall make the assumption that the payoff from each activity is determined by world market prices, and that these are independent of the activity levels in the economy. Let C = (cl, ..., cn)l, where c denotes the value of output of j activity j when it is operated at the unit level. Finally, let X = (xl, ..., x,)' denote the vector of activity levels and let Z = (zl, ..., 2,)' denote the vector of item prices.
A competitive equilibrium is characterized by a nonnega-A tive vector of activity levels, X, and a nonnegative vector of A prices, 2, such that:
2.1. The production plan is feasible, i.e.
2.2.
No activity makes a positive profit, i.e. An item in excess supply has a zero price, i.e.
2.4.
No activity that makes a negative profit is operated at a positive level, i.e.
Hence the problem of computing a competitive equilibrium is equivalent to solving the following linear complementarity problem.
Find vectors (2, 2, c, k) that satisfy: 2.6.
where In and Im are identity matrices of order n x n and m x m respectively.
As is well known (see Simonnard [2] ) , relations (2.5. ) -(2.7.) are equivalent to solving the linear programming problem :
An Equilibrium Problem with Institutional Constraints on Market Prices
In the economy described in the preceding section, there were no institutional constraints upon prices. In this section we shall introduce two such types of constraints: In section 5, more general institutional constraints on prices will be discussed.
Suppose that there is a divergence between market prices and shadow prices. Which of these prices guide the actions of economic agents? In this paper, we assume that one sector of the economy (which may be interpreted as the private sector)
is guided by market prices. The other (the public sector) is guided by shadow prices.
Suppose that the first nl activities refer to the private sector, whereas the remaining n2 activities are publicly controlled. Partiticn X and C so that:
Then X1 and C1 refer to private activities whereas X2 and C2 refer to public activities. Let us next suppose that there is a maximum price constraint on the first ml items, whereas the remaining m2 items have a minimum price constraint. The latter also include those items where the only price constraint is nonnegativity. Partition the matrix A where All is m x nl, A12 is m x n2, A21 is m2 x nl1 and A22
The vector Z = (z l,...,~m)' will refer to shadow prices, whereas the vector Y = (yl,...lym)' will refer to marketprices.
Partition Z and Y such that Z1 and Y1 refer to factors with a maximum price constraint and Z2 and Y2 refer to items with a minimum price constraint. Let the known nonnegative vectors Q1 and Q2 denote maximum and minimum prices respectively, i.e. and A price-constrained equilibrium, if it exists, is charac-
terized by a vector of activity levels, X, market prices, Y, A and shadow prices Z such that:
3.1. The production plan is feasible, i.e.
3.2.
No activity makes a positive profit, i.e.
3.3. The market prices satisfy the institutional constraints, 3.4. There is a nonnegative wedge between market and shadow
3.5.
If a factor is in excess supply, it has a zero shadow price, i.e.
3.6.
If an activity makes a negative profit, it is operated at a zero level, i.e.
A A X'U = 0 .
3.7.
The shadow price equals the market price if the institutional constraint is not binding, i.e.
Let us substitute from (3.1) into (3.2.1.) and (3.4.).
We then get:
Hence the problem of computing an equilibrium is equivalent to solving the following linear complementarity problem.
-10- Find vectors (2, 2, 9, G, k, 9) that sati,sfy:3 3.9.
where I (s=nlrn2,mlrm2) is an identity matrix of order S S X S.
The above problem C(3.8.) -(3. 10. )] does not correspond to a linear program for here there are institutional constraints upon prices.
Hence, an equilibrium solution may not be ob-3~he nonnegativity constraints G1 = Q1 -el i 0 and q2 = Q2 + c2 are dropped because they will be satisfied by any solution to (3.8.) -(3.10. (3.14.) whereas X2 with associated price vector 2, will be a solution to (3.15.).
A Numerical Example
The following numerical example may be illustrative of the preceding discussion. We have an economy with four activities and three resources. Moreover, n = 2 (number of private activities), 1 "2 = 2 (number of public activities), ml = 1 (number of items with a maximum price, e.g.
a ceiling on capital charges), m2 = 2 (number of items with a minimum price, e.g. a floor on wages or a "reservation wage"). Q1 = .1 (maximum price) Q~ = [z:] (minimum price) .
We have
Then an equilibrium solution is obtained by solving the follow- For illustrative purposes suppose that the first, second and third resource are capital, labor and land respectively.
We may then conclude that the imposition of a ceiling on capital charges and a floor on wages have led to a considerable reduction in the value of the economy's output as well as a considerable increase in unemployment. Moreover land has become a scarce resource. The example illustrates how models of this kind may be used to study the consequence of institutional constraints on market prices.
General Institutional Constraints on Market Prices
Suppose that in addition to maxi-mum and minimum constraints, there are p linear constraints on market prices given by An example will. illustrate the character of these constraints.
Suppose factor 1 is skilled labor and factor 2 is unskilled labor, and the two first constraints are:
These two constraints together imply that the wages of skilled labor shall be at least as great as the wages of unskilled labor, but shall not exceed the wages of unskilled labor by more than 20%. Constraints of this type may arise for several reasons. They may, for example, arise from the need for fairness as perceived within trade unions.
Let us partition the matrix F such that the first ml columns refer to items with a maximum price constraint and the remaining m2 to those with a minimum price constraint, i.e.
Wethen have:
An equilibrium, if it exists, is therefore characterized by a vector of activity levels 2, market prices ?, and shadow A prices Z, such that (3.1.) -(3.7.) and (5.2.) are satisfied.
Substitute from (3.3.) into (5.2.).
In order to simplify notation, let us rewrite (3.8.) in the following compact form:
Let us introduce a vector of p dummy variables, E = (el, ..., e )I. The problem of computing an equilibrium P is then equivalent to solving the following linear complementarity problem.
Find vectors (i, 2, $, 6, 6, i, ?, &) that satisfy:
